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Definition for “Limitation” in the Context of 
Prosecution History Estoppel and the All Elements 
Rule: A Proposed Solution to the Troubling Dictum 
in Kustom Signals v. Applied Concepts 
I. INTRODUCTION 
United States Patent Law is one of the most rapidly evolving 
areas of law,1 and the past few years have been particularly eventful. 
One of the focuses of recent debate has been the doctrine of 
equivalents, a long-standing legal doctrine designed to protect 
patent holders from fraud.2 The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC)—a court created two decades ago for the purpose of 
harmonizing and clarifying patent law3—has been heavily involved in 
this debate, along with the United States Supreme Court. In the 
wake of two monumental cases decided by these two courts,4 the 
CAFC recently decided the case of Kustom Signals v. Applied 
Concepts.5 In a troubling dictum, the Kustom Signals court 
announced that “[t]he word ‘or’ is not itself an ‘element’ of an 
apparatus or a step of a method, and its presence to signify 
alternative elements does not convert ‘or’ into an element.”6 This  
 
 
 1. This is true because of the changes always occurring in science and technology, the 
relatively narrow focus of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and that 
court’s ability to take many patent cases every year. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). 
 2. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Graver 
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). 
 3. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 571 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000), vacated by 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002); see also Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981)). 
 4. The two notable cases are Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17, and Festo, 234 F.3d 558. 
Each of the cases came through the CAFC and was later appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court vacated the CAFC’s Festo opinion, but not in a way that resolves the questions 
raised by this Note about the definition of “element.” See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki, Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). 
 5. Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002). 
 6. Id. at 1333. 
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statement reveals inconsistency and definitional problems in the law. 
This Note will discuss those problems and propose a solution. 
The underlying problem revealed by this dictum is that 
“element” has not been satisfactorily defined by the courts. The 
fundamental policies of patent law require that such central terms be 
defined.7 Patentees must have notice of what their patent is worth.8 
The public must know where the patentee’s rights end.9 A stable 
economy requires law that is predictable and clear, and this is 
especially important in patent law. The first part of the solution is to 
eliminate the use of the word “element” and to instead use the word 
“limitation.” Second, “limitation” must be defined functionally, so 
that the practical effect of even a single word can be recognized by 
the law. Part II will present the legal background and cases that 
frame the debate. Part III will provide details of the Kustom Signals 
case itself, and Part IV will propose and analyze a two-step solution 
to the current confusion in this area of law: (1) replacement of the 
word “element” with the word “limitation” in prosecution history 
estoppel and the All Elements Rule, and (2) clear definition of the 
word “limitation” tailored to bring consistency and accomplish the 
policies underlying these legal doctrines. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Article I, section eight of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress 
the power to “promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for 
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries.”10 Congress has used this power to establish various 
patent statutes,11 and the modern components of patent law have 
roots in patent statutes and cases more than a century old.12 The 
current patent statute requires that all new patents issued by the 
 
 7. Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party on Behalf of The Patent, 
Trademark, & Copyright Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 2001 WL 1025555, at *6–*9 (S. Ct. Aug. 
31, 2001) No. 00-1543 [hereinafter Brief for Amicus Curiae]. 
 8. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 574–75. 
 9. Id. 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 11. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 89-83, 79 Stat. 259 (1965); Patent Act, ch. 230, § 26, 16 
Stat. 198, 201 (1870); Patent Act, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836); Patent Act, ch. 7, § 
2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11 (1790). 
 12. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at *6 n.9; Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 454 (1818). 
NEL-FIN 2/15/2003  2:55 PM 
353] Definition for “Limitation” 
 355 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) be useful,13 novel,14 and not 
obvious.15 These basic requirements can be stated simply, but federal 
courts have long been elaborating and interpreting what these three 
requirements actually mean—attempting to find specific meaning in 
these general terms. 
Patents give limited legal monopoly rights to inventors or their 
assigns, but the scope of those rights depends on the quality and 
wording of the patent itself. There are two critical times for 
determining whether a patent passes muster under the statutory 
standard: when the application is submitted to the scrutiny of an 
examiner at the PTO to determine whether it should issue as a 
patent and when litigation arises concerning the already-issued 
patent. Despite the fact that an issued patent enjoys a presumption of 
validity,16 litigation often presents the more rigorous test for a patent 
because an accused infringer will often, as a defense to infringement, 
attack the validity of the patent being asserted. Litigation also differs 
from examination in that the patent claims are compared, not only to 
the prior art,17 but also to the accused device or process.18 
A. Claims 
United States patent statutes have always required that a patent 
contain a “written description” of the thing to be patented.19 In 
1836 the law was amended to require that the description contain 
“claims,”20 and it was amended again in 1870 to require the patent 
applicant to “claim the part, improvement, or combination” that 
 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 14. Id. at § 102. 
 15. Id. at § 103. 
 16. Id. § 282. 
 17. Prior art is any information that is already available to the public that could 
potentially disqualify the invention from patent protection. It is the information that could 
show that the invention is not so new after all. Prior art can include scientific articles, 
advertising material, public statements made by the inventor, published specifications, and so 
forth. The definition of prior art is very broad because of the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 102–03. Any thing “in use” or “described in a printed publication” is possible prior art. 
§§ 102–03. 
 18. A device that allegedly infringes is an accused device, and the claims of the patent it 
allegedly infringes must describe that device in order for infringement to be found. See Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38–39 (1997). 
 19. Patent Act, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (1790). 
 20. Patent Act, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
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constitutes the invention.21 Today, patents must contain claims, and 
the claim language has become the central focus of both patent 
drafting and patent litigation. The claims are made up of formal—
sometimes technical—language, carefully chosen to set forth the 
legal parameters of the invention. The claim language is scrutinized 
and compared to other inventions, publications, and other kinds of 
prior art to see if the invention is truly novel and not obvious. The 
claims are also scrutinized to determine infringement—to determine 
whether or not the subject matter of the accused device falls within 
the scope of the claims.22 Because claims have such a formal legal 
effect, the organization of words within the claims is very important, 
and courts disagree about how best to parse claim language. Courts 
have used the terms “elements” and “limitations” to refer to the 
words, phrases, and sentences that make up the claims. Still, a fierce 
debate centers on exactly what those terms mean.23 In Kustom 
Signals,24 this issue is raised in dicta, but it demonstrates forcefully 
how much depends on the definitions of these terms. 
Claims generally consist of three parts: a preamble; a transition 
phrase such as “comprising”; and a list of components, steps, and 
relationships that the applicant deems essential to defining the 
invention. Each claim is written in the form of a sentence, beginning 
with a capital letter and ending with a period. A simple claim could 
read something like this: 
An apparatus for keeping a human head dry during a shower 
comprising: 
     (a) a waterproof material larger than the head, 
     (b) connected to an elastic material at the edge of said    
           waterproof material, 
     (c) said elastic material allowing for insertion of the head, 
     (d) said elastic material keeping said waterproof material snuggly  
          fitted to, and enclosing the head. 
In this example, the preamble is “An apparatus for keeping a 
human head dry during a shower”; the transitional word is 
 
 21. Patent Act, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 198–217 (1870). 
 22. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 38–39. 
 23. The history of these terms is set forth in Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at 
*6–*8. 
 24. Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
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“comprising”; and the list of components, steps, and relationships is 
the rest of the words in the claim. By virtue of authorship, the drafter 
of a claim has full discretion in organizing a claim into subparts, and 
the author also has the option of numbering the subparts, of spacing 
them, or of distinguishing them in some other way.25 Although a 
group of words in a claim can be referred to as an element of the 
claim, the term “element” has other uses in patent law. These 
multiple and confusing definitions make “element” a problematic 
word for reasons to be discussed below.26 
B. Infringement 
Patent litigation arises when a patent holder, or patentee, elects 
to assert her patent rights against someone else that she believes is 
producing or selling a device that is identical to, or resembles very 
closely, her patented device. The patent provides notice to the public 
of the rights of the patentee,27 but once the PTO has issued a patent, 
it is up to the patentee to enforce that patent through civil actions 
against infringers. The patentee has incentive to sue infringers 
because if she does not, they may erode her rightful, limited 
monopoly and destroy the economic value of her patent. 
Infringement can be relatively easy to detect and defeat when the 
accused product is identical to the patented product. However, two 
products are never placed side by side to determine infringement. 
Rather, the accused product is compared to the claims of the 
patent.28 Because language is inherently imprecise, this comparison 
of device to language is a great source of uncertainty in the law. 
Although patent claims were described above as providing a 
formal description of the invention, a claim can also be seen as a list 
of requirements. Any device that fits the description, or meets these 
 
 25. The Code of Federal Regulations gives some guidance to patent drafters in this 
regard: “[A] claim sets forth a series of elements, each element or step of the claim should be 
separated by a line indentation.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(i) (2002); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 7, at *13. 
 26. Aside from the meaning presented here (a group of words in a claim, or series of 
claim limitations), ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Techs. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 391 
(N.D. Cal. 2000), a second definition of “element” is a portion of an accused device, as 
explained in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563 n.1 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000), vacated by 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). See also Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, 
at *10–*13. 
 27. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 574–75. 
 28. Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 724 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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requirements, is covered by the patent. Infringement is found if each 
of the requirements is met by the accused device.29 Because the claim 
language can be ambiguous and subject to more than one 
interpretation, the court interprets the claim language and sets forth 
which of the plausible interpretations will be used.30 Once the court 
has completed this interpretation process, it is up to the jury to 
compare the accused device to the patent claims as construed by the 
court.31 If the jury finds that the accused device has all the 
requirements of a claim, it finds literal infringement.32 
This description of the process for determining literal 
infringement has used the word “requirements” to describe the 
components of a claim. Note that the court aids jury members to 
determine what those requirements are before the jury compares the 
patent claims to the accused device to decide whether infringement 
has occurred. Both the claim interpretation (or claim construction) 
by the court and the comparison by the jury are potential sources of 
uncertainty in the law. The question of how to subdivide claims into 
requirements is at the heart of the troubling dictum in Kustom 
Signals. 
C. Doctrine of Equivalents 
Under current law, infringement may also occur under the 
doctrine of equivalents.33 If literal infringement were the only kind of 
infringement, it would perhaps be easier to predict the outcome in 
infringement actions because the uncertainty would lie principally in 
the various possibilities of claim construction. However, restricting 
infringement to literal infringement would also provide opportunities 
for third parties to commit fraud on patents; the public could use its 
clear knowledge of the patent boundaries to approach so near to 
literal infringement that the effect would be the same: 
Such a requirement [that the patented device be copied in every 
detail for infringement to be found] would frustrate the protective 
potency of the patent laws for the skillful counterfeiter could make 
 
 29. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38–39 (1997). 
 30. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 33. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40. 
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inconsequential changes in the patented device, which though  
adding nothing, would take his imitation beyond the reach of the 
law.34 
The doctrine of equivalents is used to prevent this kind of 
counterfeiting. Originating in 1853,35 this doctrine was explained a 
century later by Justice Jackson: “Equivalence, in the patent law, is 
not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered 
in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose 
and in every respect.”36 Thus the doctrine of equivalents is used to 
expand patent rights beyond their literal boundaries to prevent 
fraud.37 A product infringes through the doctrine of equivalents if it 
does not contain all the exact requirements in the claim language, 
but very nearly so.38 Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
is also called nontextual infringement because infringement can be 
found even though the literal textual requirements are not met.39 
Courts have divided the test for finding equivalents into three 
parts: function, way, and result.40 If the accused device and the 
patented device accomplish substantially the same function, in the  
 
 34. Love Tractor, Inc. v. Continental Farm Equip. Co., 91 F. Supp. 193, 199 (D. Neb. 
1950), rev’d, 199 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1952). 
 35. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (1 How.) 330 (1853). 
 36. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609. 
 37. In one famous formulation of this principle, Judge Learned Hand said: 
Coming then to the question of infringement, we are first to interpret the claims in 
the light of disclosure; and both the claims and the disclosure in the setting of the 
prior art. In these respects a patent is like any other legal instrument; but it is 
peculiar in this, that after all aids to interpretation have been exhausted, and the 
scope of the claims has been enlarged as far as the words can be stretched, on proper 
occasions courts make them cover more than their meaning will bear. If they applied 
the law with inexorable rigidity, they would never do this, but would remit the 
patentee to his remedy of re-issue, and that is exactly what they frequently do. Not 
always, however, for at times they resort to the ‘doctrine of equivalents’ to temper 
unsparing logic and prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention. 
No doubt, this is, strictly speaking, an anomaly; but it is one which courts have 
frankly faced and accepted almost from the beginning. All patents are entitled to its 
benefit to an extent, measured on the one hand by their contribution to the art, and 
on the other by the degree to which it is necessary to depart from the meaning to 
reach a just result. 
Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948) (footnote 
omitted). 
 38. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40; Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608–09. 
 39. See Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 40. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39–40; Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608–09. 
NEL-FIN 2/15/2003  2:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
360 
substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result, 
the two are found to be equivalent.41 
D. The All Elements Rule 
The doctrine of equivalents is meant to prevent fraud on the 
patent system, but this doctrine is also susceptible to exploitation. 
Just as unscrupulous and clever infringers can attempt to defraud a 
patentee (and can be thwarted by the doctrine of equivalents), so can 
a patentee defraud the public by attempting to extend her patent 
rights beyond reasonable bounds through the doctrine of 
equivalents. Patent law has developed restraints on the doctrine of 
equivalents to prevent this problem. One fundamental restraint is the 
All Elements Rule. 
The All Elements Rule refines the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents in two important ways. First, it requires that the 
equivalents analysis focus on matching parts of the claim language to 
equivalent parts or components (elements) of the accused device.42 
This aspect of the All Elements Rule comes from the word 
“elements” in the rule. Thus, the All Elements Rule dictates that the 
way to determine if a product infringes through the doctrine of 
equivalents is not to examine the product as a whole to see if it 
resembles the claimed invention.43 Rather, the analysis must be a 
disciplined and systematic one, where each element is compared; the 
function/way/result analysis must be made “element by element.”44 
As this Note discusses below, many patent disputes hinge upon 
what part of the claim language should be the subject of comparison 
in the function/way/result process. It is clear that the analysis must 
be made element by element, but how much of the claim language 
constitutes an element? The question of how to break an invention 
down into physical elements, coupled with the question of how to 
break a claim down into sub-parts or language elements, is at the 
heart of the troubling dictum in Kustom Signals. 
 
 41. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39–40; Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608–09; Union 
Paper Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877); Royal Typewriter, 168 F.2d at 
692. 
 42. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40. 
 43. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 44. Id. This is sometimes known as the “Pennwalt rule.” Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & 
Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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The second important way that the All Elements Rule refines the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents is that it requires each piece 
or component of the claimed invention to have a corresponding 
piece or component in the accused device.45 Thus, it requires all the 
claimed elements to be present in the accused device. This aspect of 
the All Elements Rule comes from the word “all” in the rule. But 
this aspect of the doctrine of equivalents necessarily dovetails with 
literal infringement: each of the requirements set forth by a claim 
must be met either literally or by an equivalent in order for 
infringement to be found. In other words, a patentee will not 
succeed in an infringement action if the accused product lacks one of 
the claimed elements completely,46 even if the two products generally 
accomplish the same result in substantially the same way.47 Note that 
the All Elements Rule helps the accused infringer because it 
necessitates that each requirement of the claim have a corresponding 
counterpart in the accused device; the patentee may not successfully 
assert that the accused device is generally similar to her claimed 
device without showing this correspondence. 
The United States Supreme Court recently helped define the 
parameters of the current doctrine of equivalents in Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.48 The Supreme Court 
held that the doctrine was still intact in view of the 1952 Patent 
Act49 and established the All Elements Rule for the doctrine of 
equivalents.50 The Court stated that the reasons for amendments 
made to claim language during prosecution help determine whether 
or not the amendments will later give rise to estoppel.51 The Court 
also held that the patent holder has the burden of explaining the 
 
 45. Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 46. Id.; see also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. 
 47. However, where the patent drafter has written comprising claims—the majority of 
patent claims are written using the transitional phrase “comprising” to introduce the list of 
requirements—an accused product will infringe if it contains all the limitations required by the 
patent and merely adds some additional features or steps. See, e.g., Kustom Signals, Inc. v. 
Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 48. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 50. Although the CAFC had already established the rule en banc in Pennwalt Corp. v. 
Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987), Warner-Jenkinson represented 
the first time that the Supreme Court had endorsed the rule. 
 51. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33. See infra Part II.E for a discussion of prosecution 
history estoppel. 
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reason for the amendment and defeating the presumption that all 
amendments are made for “substantial reasons relating to 
patentability” and thus should give rise to estoppel.52 
E. Prosecution History Estoppel 
The doctrine of equivalents is thus restrained by the All Elements 
Rule, but this is not the only safeguard the law places on that 
doctrine. A second restraint on a patentee’s use of the doctrine of 
equivalents to unfairly expand patent rights is called prosecution 
history estoppel.53 If a patent applicant—during the course of 
prosecution—is forced by the examiner to limit her broad claims 
(thus relinquishing subject matter) in order to meet the 
requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and so forth, prosecution 
history estoppel prohibits her from later reclaiming the relinquished 
subject matter.54 If the applicant limits her claims by making limiting 
arguments to the patent examiner, the result is argument-based 
estoppel.55 If the applicant limits her claims by amending them, the 
result is amendment-based estoppel.56 The limitations made during 
prosecution thus remain in force, and the correspondence between 
patent attorney and patent examiner serves as a record of these 
limitations.57 
A recent Supreme Court case, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., treated the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel.58 In Festo, the Court vacated a holding of the CAFC59 and 
reaffirmed the holding of Warner-Jenkinson that when a patentee 
 
 52. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33. 
 53. See id. at 30. 
 54. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 55. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 586 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000), vacated by 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). 
 56. Id. 
 57. “The doctrine of equivalents . . . is not a tool for expanding the protection of a 
patent after examination has been completed.” Southwall Techs., Inc., 54 F.3d at 1579. 
Prosecution history estoppel limits the range of equivalents available to a patentee by 
preventing recapture of subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the patent. See 
Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 
Townsend Eng’g Co. v. HiTec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 58. 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). This case was immensely important to the patent bar, has 
sparked much debate, and has inspired numerous law review articles. 
 59. The Supreme Court disagreed that a more robust estoppel doctrine was in order, 
arguing that the established rules should not be changed. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841. 
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amends the claims during patent prosecution without explaining the 
amendment, prosecution history estoppel is presumed to apply and 
bars the use of the doctrine of equivalents “as to that element.”60 
The Court went even further in Festo, stating that “[a] patentee’s 
decision to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed 
to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim 
and the amended claim.”61 But the Court explicitly held that 
prosecution history estoppel does not present a complete and 
insurmountable bar to the doctrine of equivalents: “[a patentee may] 
rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim to equivalence . . . 
[by showing] that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the 
art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that 
would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”62 Although 
this holding was contrary to the CAFC’s holding below, one aspect 
of the CAFC’s holding was not reversed by the Supreme Court: 
when the presumption is not rebutted and prosecution history 
estoppel does apply, it applies with respect to the amended element.63 
Thus, determining what constitutes an element is of vital importance 
under the Supreme Court’s Festo rule. 
F. “Element” for Prosecution History Estoppel 
Neither the CAFC nor the Supreme Court addressed the 
meaning of the term “element” that is so central to the operation of 
the Festo rule of prosecution history estoppel. The CAFC did, 
however, explain its view of the difference between the terms 
“element” and “limitation” in a footnote.64 The CAFC explained 
that, although courts had used the term “element” to refer to words 
in a claim, the better term for such a use was “limitation.” It 
explained further that the word “elements” should be used to refer 
 
 60. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). 
 61. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1842. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated by 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). 
 64. “In our prior cases, we have used both the term ‘element’ and the term ‘limitation’ 
to refer to words in a claim. . . . It is preferable to use the term ‘limitation’ when referring to 
claim language and the term ‘element’ when referring to the accused device. . . . However, 
because the en banc questions use the term ‘element,’ we use that term in this opinion.” Festo, 
234 F.3d at 563 n.1 (citations omitted). 
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to portions of the accused device.65 Despite this, the CAFC used the 
term “element” instead of the term “limitation” to refer to portions 
of the claim language, because in asking the parties to brief issues for 
the en banc hearing, the court itself had framed the issues using the 
term “element” rather than the term “limitation.”66 This, in turn, 
was a result of the Supreme Court’s use of the term “element” in the 
Warner-Jenkinson opinion.67 The inconsistencies in the terminology 
of these various courts indicate the growing need for a uniform 
definition. 
The law of prosecution history estoppel under Festo68 has created 
a new battleground.69 Litigants are now prone to disagree on the 
meaning of the term “element,” because prosecution history 
estoppel applies only to those words that constitute the amended 
element. The larger the relevant element is deemed to be, or the 
more words or phrases in the section of the claim that comprise the 
element, the more the patentee is hurt. This is because the estoppel, 
which bars the patentee from asserting infringement by equivalents, 
now applies to a larger portion of the claims. If the relevant element 
consists of only one or two words, the patentee is helped because a 
larger portion of the claims is not barred from assertions of 
equivalents. 
The Warner-Jenkinson and Festo opinions have left the patent bar 
with this burning question: if an element is so important to the 
rights of patentees under prosecution history estoppel, what exactly 
is an element? The question remains unresolved, but a recent federal 
case provides a practical example. In ACLARA Biosciences,70 the 
court parsed one phrase in the claim at issue into three logical 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. (“[B]ecause the en banc questions use the term ‘element,’ we use that term 
in this opinion.”). This strange approach by the CAFC reveals that perhaps the importance of 
these terms was not as apparent to the court before the opinion was actually written. 
Subsequent cases, including Kustom Signals, continue to reveal their importance. 
 67. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 68. The law is that any amendment made to a claim, for a substantial reason relating to 
patentability, during prosecution of a patent will give rise to a presumption of prosecution 
history estoppel with respect to the amended claim element. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1840, 1842 (2002) (emphasis added); see also Festo, 
234 F.3d at 566. 
 69. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at *9. 
 70. ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Techs. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 391 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
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parts.71 The clause was written as follows: “a plurality of electrodes 
positioned to be in electrical contact with a medium when present in 
said trenches.”72 The court parsed it in the following manner, 
referring to the word groupings as “components”: 
(1) there must be at least two electrodes (“the number of 
electrodes component”); (2) the electrodes must be in direct 
contact with the medium when the medium is present in the 
trenches, but the electrodes themselves do not have to be physically 
situated in the trenches (“the non-insulation component”); and (3) 
the electrodes must be positioned at-[sic] intermediate points along 
the lengthwise axis of a trench, and not just at either end of the 
trench (“the electrode configuration component”).73 
The court also held that, while one of the components had been 
amended, and thus the prosecution history barred equivalent claims 
with respect to that component, prosecution history estoppel did not 
apply to the other two components.74 Note that the patentee was 
allowed to assert equivalents for more of the claim language than 
would have been allowed if the court had not parsed the clause into 
three parts.75 The court thus advanced the idea that courts should be 
free to define the element to which the bar applies, defining it to be 
limited to only a few words in some cases. 
G. “Element” for the All Elements Rule 
In the context of the All Elements Rule, the prevailing question 
is similar: what is an element in the wake of Warner-Jenkinson and 
Festo? Several cases reveal the difficulty. In Corning Glass Works v. 
Sumitomo Electric U.S.A, Inc., the CAFC explained: “‘Element’ may 
be used to mean a single limitation, but it has also been used to 
 
 71. “To clarify, it is useful to isolate the various components of the ‘plurality of 
electrodes’ limitation. According to the Court’s previous orders, the phrase [in question] 
contains three separate requirements. . . .” Id. at 400. 
 72. Id. at 392. 
 73. Id. at 400. 
 74. Id. 
 75. In the end, the court held that since ACLARA had never amended the claim to alter 
what the patent taught about the placement of electrodes, “no potential competitor was left 
wondering what range of equivalents a fact finder might apply in deciding whether some other 
electrode configuration was substantially similar.” Id. at 401. The court pointed out that this 
amendment did not implicate “[t]he Federal Circuit’s concerns about fostering innovation, 
reducing litigation, and minimizing the uncertainty facing the public.” Id. at 402. 
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mean a series of limitations which, taken together, make up a 
component of the claimed invention.”76 The same court also referred 
to this question when it said that “[r]eferences to ‘elements’ can be 
misleading. . . . [C]larity is advanced when sufficient wording is 
employed to indicate when ‘element[]’ is intended to mean a 
component . . . of an embodiment of an invention and when it is 
intended to mean a feature set forth in or as a limitation in a 
claim.”77 Thus, the CAFC has explained that in the context of the All 
Elements Rule, an element can be a relatively large or small grouping 
of the words in a claim; the same uncertainty in definition that has 
burdened courts in the context of prosecution history estoppel is also 
a problem in this context. But Corning Glass is most quoted for a 
further clarification between “elements” and “limitations.” The All 
Elements Rule can also be thought of as the All Limitations Rule: 
“[For the All Elements Rule,] [a]n equivalent must be found for 
every limitation of the claim somewhere in an accused device, but 
not necessarily in a corresponding component, although that is 
generally the case.”78 The CAFC further clarified five years later: 
This language [in Corning Glass] . . . did not alter the Pennwalt 
rule to create a more expansive test for infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents. This language in Corning Glass did not 
substitute a broader limitation-by-limitation comparison for the 
doctrine of equivalents than the element-by-element comparison in 
Pennwalt. Rather, the Corning Glass court merely clarified the 
meaning of the term “element” in the context of the Pennwalt 
rule.79 
This clarification—showing a certain interchangeability between 
the terms “element” and “limitation”—is useful, but it still does not 
answer the question of what portion of claim language makes up an 
element/limitation. 
Nevertheless, the courts have not had the same explicit 
disagreement about the definition of an element in the context of 
the All Elements Rule as they have had in the context of prosecution 
 
 76. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
 77. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987). 
 78. Corning Glass, 868 F.2d at 1259. 
 79. Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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history estoppel. Indeed, the courts have often implicitly assumed 
the definition of an element for purposes of this rule.80 
In Kustom Signals,81 these implicit assumptions are taken one 
step further. The CAFC seems to say that not only can an element 
consist of a portion of claim language containing many words and 
clauses, but in order to be an element, it must contain more than the 
single word “or”—no matter how significant a role that word might 
play in the claims.82 
III. KUSTOM SIGNALS, INC., V. APPLIED CONCEPTS, INC. 
A. Background 
In the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, Kustom 
Signals, Inc. sued Applied Concepts, Inc. for infringement of a 
patent on traffic radar technology (the ‘246 patent).83 The court 
granted summary judgment finding noninfringement on two 
grounds: (1) no literal infringement,84 and (2) no doctrine of 
equivalents infringement because of the All Elements Rule.85 Kustom 
Signals appealed to the CAFC.86 On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment under two theories: no literal 
 
 80. In the Corning Glass case, the following group of limiting words was considered an 
element: “to which a dopant material has been added to a degree in excess of that of the 
cladding layer.” Corning Glass, 868 F.2d at 1260. In a Court of Federal Claims case, an 
element was a numbered portion of a claim: “(3) a locking means, for selectively engaging (for 
two of the four axis [sic]) and disengaging (for the other two of the four axis [sic]) the two 
respective control means, in a collective helicopter control mechanism.” Messerschmidt v. 
United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 1, 54 (1993). The court refers to it as “a locking device” for short. 
Id. In the CAFC’s Dolly case, an element was a lettered part of a claim: “(d) a stable rigid 
frame which is formed in part from said side panels and which along with said seat panel and 
said back panel provides a body supporting feature, said stable rigid frame being self-
supporting and free standing, whereby the said child’s chair is readily portable and easily 
stored.” Dolly, 16 F.3d at 396. The court refers to it as the “stable rigid frame limitation.” Id. 
at 398. 
 81. Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002). 
 82. Id. at 1333. 
 83. U.S. Patent No. 5,528,246 (issued June 18, 1996). See Kustom Signals, Inc. v. 
Applied Concepts, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (D. Kan. 1999), aff’d, 264 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1537 (2002). 
 84. Id. at 1276. 
 85. Id. at 1283. 
 86. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d 1326. 
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infringement,87 and no infringement through equivalents because of 
prosecution history estoppel.88 The All Elements Rule, on the other 
hand, was found not to bar the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.89 
The technology at issue in this case was the traffic radar devices 
used by law enforcement officers to detect speeding cars. Traffic 
radar devices send radio signals toward moving vehicles and then 
analyze the rebound signals to determine characteristics about the 
vehicles such as speed. Both the claimed Kustom Signals radar and 
the accused Applied Concepts radar use Fast Fourier Transforms to 
digitally process the return signals, and each radar allows 
identification and analysis of, not only the fastest return signal, but 
also the strongest return signal.90 This two-fold analysis had been 
possible in older analog radars, but the Kustom Signals radar was the 
first digital radar to incorporate this analysis.91 
Both radars have a form of “multi-mode” operation, including a 
mode switch, but there is one key difference. The disclosed Kustom 
Signals radar processes the data to a certain point and finishes the 
processing only upon the radar operator’s selection of a mode. The 
radar operator may flip the switch, choosing to display the speed of 
the fastest-moving vehicle or the vehicle that returns the strongest 
signal.92 By contrast, the accused Applied Concepts radar fully 
processes the return data, making either result available to be viewed 
upon demand; the mode switch merely allows the operator to select 
whether to display the speed of the fastest or the strongest signal, not 
whether to process the data to determine the speed of the selected 
signal and then display the result.93 
B. Claim Terms at Issue 
As was emphasized above, any analysis of a patent case must 
begin with a discussion of the language employed in the claims. In 
 
 87. Id. at 1332. 
 88. Id. at 1333. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Kustom Signals, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1264–65. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1328–29; see also Kustom Signals, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 
1264–65. The strongest signal usually comes from the closest or largest target. Kustom Signals, 
52 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. 
 93. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1329. 
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three distinct claims in the ‘246 patent, Kustom Signals employed 
the term “or.”94 Claim 1[e]: “A method . . . comprising the step[] 
of . . . searching said components in memory for the component that 
meets preselected magnitude or frequency criteria”; Claim 16[d]: 
“In a traffic radar, apparatus . . . comprising . . . means for searching 
the components stored in said memory means to identify the 
component that meets preselected magnitude or frequency criteria”; 
and Claim 20[f]: “In a traffic radar, apparatus . . . comprising . . . 
means under operator control for selecting either a greatest 
magnitude or highest frequency search, whereby either strongest 
signal or fastest signal target identification is provided.”95 
During prosecution of this patent, the attorney inserted the term 
“or” in clause 1[e] in place of the word “and” as a result of a 
rejection for obviousness over another radar system associated with 
Patent No. 3,631,486 to Anders.96 The “or” in clause 16[d] was 
added for the same reason. The “either” and “or” terminology in 
clause 20[f] was already in the claim before the rejection.97 
“The district court construed the term ‘or’ to mean a choice 
between either one of two alternatives, but not both.’”98 Kustom 
Signals argued on appeal that “or” should have been construed in 
the logical operator sense: “[or] returns a ‘true’ value when one or 
both values are true,” as distinguished from “exclusive or,” which 
“returns a ‘true’ value when only one value is true.”99 The CAFC 
affirmed the district court’s claim construction, holding that Kustom 
signals did not show that it intended anything other than the 
common usage of “or” and “either” to designate alternatives.100 The 
 
 94. Id. at 1330. 
 95. Id. at 1329–30 (emphasis and clause letters added by the CAFC). 
 96. The Anders patent is a piece of prior art with the potential to disqualify the ‘246 
patent, but it is not relevant to this Note other than in the role described here. 
 97. The CAFC called attention to comments made by Kustom’s attorney during 
prosecution of the patent: “‘Claim [20] specifically calls for two search modes under operator 
selection.’ Kustom described its invention as having ‘multi-mode operation,’ whereby the 
desired mode . . . would be selected by the operator. It is apparent that the modes of search 
and display were intended, in the ‘246 invention, to be selected in the alternative.” Kustom 
Signals, 264 F.3d at 1331. 
 98. Id. at 1330. 
 99. Id. at 1330–31. 
 100. Id. at 1332. This claim interpretation may seem strange given the technical context 
of the patent, but the court relied on the default (plain meaning) approach to interpretation. 
The district court analyzed detailed flow charts in the specification and concluded that the 
plain meaning was intended. Id. at 1331. 
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CAFC stated that the limiting term “or” requires the exclusion of 
devices whose memory search includes magnitude and frequency.101 
C. Literal Infringement 
The CAFC, like the district court, pursued a three-part 
infringement analysis, agreeing with two of the three holdings from 
the court below.102 The CAFC first analyzed literal infringement.103 
Kustom Signals argued before the CAFC that the further processing 
by the Applied Concepts radar—wherein it calculates for the 
strongest signal as well, despite being in fastest signal mode (or vice-
versa)—is simply an additional function and that “performance of an 
additional step is irrelevant when the claimed steps are 
performed.”104 Thus, Kustom Signals asserted that the accused 
device completely overlapped with Kustom’s patent, and the mere 
addition of additional features did not negate the infringement.105 
For this result, Kustom Signals relied on its use of the term 
“comprising” to introduce its patent claims because that term 
“opens a method claim to the inclusion of steps in addition to those 
stated in the claim.”106 However, the court found that in the ‘246 
patent the “clause imposing the limiting term ‘or’ requires the 
exclusion of devices whose memory search includes magnitude and 
frequency”107; therefore, there was no literal infringement.108 
D. Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The second two infringement analyses dealt with alternative 
theories under the doctrine of equivalents—one under the All 
Elements Rule and one under prosecution history estoppel. Under 
 
 101. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1333; Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 
52 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1279 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 102. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1332–33. 
 103. Id. at 1332. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.; see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 
(1997). 
 106. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1332; see also Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS Inc., 
793 F.2d 1261, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 107. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1332. 
 108. “The district court correctly held that the accused device, by its search of both 
magnitude and frequency without operator instruction, is outside the literal scope of the 
claims.” Id. at 1333. 
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each analysis, the district court had found no infringement. The 
district court’s All Elements reasoning was that “finding the accused 
device equivalent to the claimed invention would eliminate the ‘or’ 
element of the claims, thereby violating the [A]ll [E]lements 
[R]ule.”109 The district court described the element to which it 
referred as follows: “One of the elements of Claims 1, 16, and 20 is 
that the radar searches and displays either the strongest or fastest 
target but not both. This selective display element, or its equivalent, 
is absent from the . . . [Applied Concepts] radar.”110 
The CAFC disagreed with the district court’s application of the 
All Elements Rule, stating that “[t]he word ‘or’ is not itself an 
‘element’ of an apparatus or a step of a method, and its presence to 
signify alternative elements does not convert ‘or’ into an element.”111 
This announcement is amazing since, just paragraphs earlier, the 
court had affirmed that there was no literal infringement on the sole 
ground that the limitation imposed on the claim by the word “or” 
was not met by the accused device. It makes one wonder: if the word 
“or” can impose limitations for purposes of literal infringement, why 
is it not an element for purposes of the doctrine of equivalents?112 
Despite disagreeing with the district court’s All Elements 
analysis, the reviewing court held that prosecution history estoppel 
limited Kustom Signals’ claim of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents; the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on 
this alternative ground.113 The CAFC held that both kinds of 
prosecution history estoppel applied: amendment-based estoppel 
(invoked by Kustom Signal’s amendment to claim terms 1 and 16)114 
and argument-based estoppel (invoked by Kustom Signal’s 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1279 (D. 
Kan. 1999). 
 111. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1333. 
 112. This question reveals the main problem with the troubling dictum in the Kustom 
Signals case. Literal infringement and infringement by the doctrine of equivalents are parallel 
and alternative analyses, and both are asserted together in countless patent cases. If a word is 
considered important under one of the two analyses, there seems to be little reason that it 
would not also be important in the other analysis. This is especially true when the word is 
important in the literal infringement analysis because literal infringement is by its very terms 
more exacting than infringement by equivalents. 
 113. Kustom Signals, 264 F.3d at 1333. 
 114. Invoked with respect to clause 1[e] and 16[d]. Id. 
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arguments distinguishing claim 20 from prior art).115 Thus, the 
CAFC affirmed both holdings of the court below (no literal 
infringement and no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents) 
but used different reasoning than the district court to arrive at the 
second result. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The troubling dictum from the CAFC in Kustom Signals 
demonstrates the confusion in patent law over the definition of the 
term “element.” Given that the term has more than one definition 
even in this specialized area of the law, it is understandable that this 
confusion exists. The confusion is also a result of the rapid growth of 
patent law and the continuing evolution of its governing rules. The 
CAFC has taken some steps to clarify the meanings of the terms 
“element” and “limitation,”116 but more is needed. In particular, two 
steps are needed to clear away the confusion associated with these 
definitions. First, the word “element” must be completely eliminated 
from prosecution history estoppel and from the All Elements Rule, 
and the word “limitation” must replace it. Second, the size of a 
limitation must be determined from the prosecution history and 
from comparison to the prior art. This analysis will show how the 
result in Kustom Signals would be harmonized by this approach, and 
this analysis will also show the viability and implications of these two 
steps. 
A. Elimination of the term “element” 
The first step toward clarification of the claim language 
terminology will be to eliminate the term “element” and replace it 
with the less ambiguous term “limitation.” The term “element” has 
at least two different meanings in the context of patent law, and its 
use breeds confusion.117 One meaning of “element” refers to a 
physical component of a device.118 Another meaning of “element” 
 
 115. Invoked with respect to clause 20[f]. Id.; see supra note 97. 
 116. See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 
(Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 117. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at *6–*13. 
 118. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 563 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated by 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). 
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refers to a word or group of words in a claim.119 These two meanings 
are especially confusing in definitions and analysis of patent law 
because, in the patent context, devices are constantly being 
compared to descriptive language. At first it may seem convenient to 
use the term “element” to refer to both a physical component of a 
device and the corresponding words in claim language that describe 
that physical element. However, this same convenience leads to 
imprecision. 
“Limitation,” on the other hand, has no such dual identity. The 
courts have used this word consistently to refer to the language of 
the claims, and they have never used this term to refer to the 
embodiments of that language—the components of a device.120 Not 
only is the word “limitation” inherently less confusing because of its 
consistent historical use, but the proposed conversion from 
“element” to “limitation” is already underway in patent law. The 
CAFC has already started to change from using the word “element” 
to emphasizing the basic underlying component of the claims—the 
limiting words themselves.121 
1. “Limitation” is a better fit for prosecution history estoppel 
One sign that the shift has already started from “element” to 
“limitation” is the Festo footnote, which suggested that between the 
words “limitation” and “element,” “limitation” is more suited to 
describe portions of claim language.122 Indeed, this footnote 
identifies “element” with the concrete realm of embodiments, using 
“element” to apply only to portions of an accused device. This 
essentially eliminates the term “element” from prosecution history 
estoppel because the accused device is not the focus of that analysis. 
Prosecution history estoppel just involves the statements and actions 
of the claim drafter—the amendments made to claim language or the 
limiting arguments made to the examiner. Both of these, on a 
 
 
 119. Id.; see also ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Techs. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 
391, 402 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 120. See supra Part II.F–G. 
 121. Festo, 234 F.3d at 563 n.1; see also Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., 
Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 
394, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 122. Festo, 234 F.3d at 563 n.1; see also Perkin-Elmer Corp., 822 F.2d at 1533 n.9. 
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fundamental level, involve limiting language and have very little to 
do directly with an embodiment of the invention.123 
The notice function of claims and the desirability of clear 
disclosure to the public militate for elimination of the term 
“element” from the context of prosecution history estoppel. The 
Supreme Court acknowledged in Festo that “clarity is essential to 
promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in 
innovation. A patent owner should know what he owns, and the 
public should know what he does not [own].”124 Through 
eliminating a term with two distinct definitions, the possibility for 
confusion will be decreased. The CAFC noted in Corning Glass that 
“clarity is advanced when sufficient wording is employed to indicate 
when ‘elements’ is intended to mean a component . . . of an 
embodiment of an invention and when it is intended to mean a 
feature set forth in or as a limitation in a claim.” Clarity could be 
even further advanced if the dual-definition word was abandoned 
completely and the defining words—embodiment and limitation—
were employed in its place.125 
The change away from “element” would fit with the ACLARA 
court’s “nuanced approach”126 to prosecution history estoppel. The 
ACLARA court extols a “limited rule that evaluates closely which 
specific portion of amended claim language is consistent with the 
meaning of the term ‘limitation.’”127 The ACLARA court cites 
authorities that decry the confusion created by the two meanings of 
“element,” and then summarizes the two meanings in a way that 
does not require the word “element” at all.128 
 
 123. Corning Glass, 868 F.2d at 1259. 
 124. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1837 
(2002). 
 125. Stated in more abstract terms, the current problem is one of multiple definition. 
Because multiple definitions have been assigned to one name, it is probably best to reassign 
those definitions, each to a separate name. This Note emphasizes the utility of the word 
“limitation” because it is useful in the context of prosecution history estoppel and the All 
Elements Rule. While “limitation” is the clear choice for one of the multiple meanings, several 
words would suffice for the other meaning. Physical embodiment, portion, or component are 
all candidates. “Embodiment” is suggested here because it demonstrates the link between 
words and their physical counterparts. 
 126. A recent federal case thus referred to the ACLARA approach. Creo Prods., Inc. v. 
Presstek, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-525-GMS, 2001 WL 637397, at *9 (D. Del. May 11, 2001). 
 127. ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Techs. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 391, 402 
(N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 128. “Element” appears in a parenthetical: “These authorities suggest that a single clause 
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Eliminating the term “element” would be consistent with the 
two recent landmark Supreme Court cases concerning patent law. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court did nothing to discourage the 
elimination of the term in either the Warner-Jenkinson or the Festo 
cases. Although Festo reaffirmed the doctrine of equivalents and used 
the term “element,” consistent with former use of that word, the 
term “limitation” could have replaced the term “element” with no 
change in the result of either Warner-Jenkinson or Festo. 
2. “All Limitations Rule” is a better fit for current law than “All 
Elements Rule” 
At first blush, the change from “element” to “limitation” for 
purposes of the All Elements Rule might seem to be a drastic change 
because the rule itself contains the word “elements.” However, the 
shift has already begun from “element” to “limitation” in this 
context as well. For example, the court in Corning Glass explained 
that comparison of the claims with the accused product should 
actually be according to limitations: “[For the All Elements Rule], 
[a]n equivalent must be found for every limitation of the claim 
somewhere in an accused device, but not necessarily in a 
corresponding component, although that is generally the case.”129 In 
other words, the elements (i.e., physical components) of the claimed 
invention and the accused product do not have to be compared at 
all. The limitations of the claim must be compared to the accused 
device.130 
The CAFC later confirmed the idea that changing from an 
“elements” formulation to a “limitations” formulation of the rule 
 
in a claim describing one particular physical structure (an “element” of a device embodying the 
invention) can contain several limitations. In other words, every clause in a claim is not a 
discrete limitation; instead, a clause can contain one or more limitations.” ACLARA, 125 F. 
Supp. 2d at 402. Another federal case also manages to avoid the word “element” completely: 
“[The question is] whether the ‘complete bar’ . . . applies when only a portion of the claim 
language was amended during the patent prosecution and the parties dispute whether the 
amendment altered one limitation within a claim or a series of limitations[.]” Creo Prods., 2001 
WL 637397, at *9 (emphasis added). 
 129. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
 130. Limitations drive the infringement analysis. Each requirement of the claim is 
analyzed in turn, and for each of those limitations, a corresponding element is sought in the 
accused device. Because it is the limitations that matter most for purposes of this comparison 
process, the specific word “limitation” should take the place of the more confusing word 
“element.” 
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does not change the rule, but rather clarifies it: “[T]he Corning Glass 
court merely clarified the meaning of the term ‘element’ in the 
context of the Pennwalt rule.”131 The CAFC has not limited itself to 
hints about the propriety of the term “limitation.” As early as 1989, 
the CAFC explicitly endorsed such a wording in Johnston v. IVAC 
Corp.132: “A more precise name [for the All Elements Rule] would 
be the All Limitations Rule.”133 
Aside from the CAFC’s endorsement of the proposed change 
from “element” to “limitation,” there is a logical, grammar-based 
reason for the change. Because courts have sometimes used 
“element” to refer to a group of limiting words in the claim 
language, “limitation” has consistently identified the smaller segment 
of claim language. Thus, “limitation” is the more inclusive word in 
the sense that all the elements will be automatically present if all the 
limitations are present. Indeed, if each limitation of a claim is met in 
an accused device, each element is necessarily met with no further 
analysis needed. Furthermore, as the Corning Glass court explained, 
the way elements are organized in a claim need not correspond to 
the way components of an invention are organized, except that the 
underlying limitations must all be present.134 Limitations are the 
true, discrete, functional building blocks of the claims. By focusing 
the All Limitations Rule and prosecution history estoppel on the 
fundamental building blocks of the claims, confusion will be 
minimized. 
B. Definition of “Limitation” 
Solidifying the change in terminology from “element” to 
“limitation” is not the only step that will be needed to clarify the 
doctrine of equivalents and its related rules. The fundamental 
policies of patent law also require that the term “limitation” be 
 
 131. Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 399 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
 132. 885 F.2d 1574, 1578 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 133. The CAFC further cemented this idea in 1998 and 1999. Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. 
Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. 
United States Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1317 n.* (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 134. An equivalent must be found for every limitation of the claim somewhere in an 
accused device, but not necessarily in a corresponding component, although that is generally 
the case. Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
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defined.135 It must be defined so that the patentee knows what will 
later be considered a limitation if the claims are involved in litigation. 
It must be defined so that those who read the issued patent and the 
prosecution history will know which words in the claim can be read 
literally and which must be read with an eye to possible equivalents. 
A working definition is needed for the stability of industry and the 
economy. Inventors and their competitors must be allowed to 
predict with accuracy what the courts will consider to be a 
limitation.136 
The best way to define the size of a limitation is to do it with 
reference to a limiting act. This approach to a definition is practical 
because it does not divorce the function of the words in the literal 
infringement context from their role in the doctrine of equivalents 
context. Arbitrary form must not be exalted above practical function. 
The limiting act can be the drafting of a claim, an argument 
made to an examiner, an amendment made in response to the 
examiner’s rejection, or even inclusion of unnecessary language in 
the claim. Said alternatively, the key to defining the size of a 
limitation will be determining from context the actual effect of the 
language. The drafting of every claim is of course a limiting act.  
Each word, clause, and sentence helps to define the scope of the 
claimed subject matter.  But the court must group the words into 
functional units—as small as a single word or as large as a full clause. 
If there has been an amendment, the question will be: what does the 
claim as amended require that was not required by the language 
before amendment? If a patentee limits her rights through argument 
or amendment-based prosecution, that act defines a limitation. If a 
patentee limits her rights by including an unnecessary limitation, 
then the All Limitations Rule is binding and lesser-included 
inventions will not infringe.137 By contrast, a patentees’ preliminary 
 
 135. Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at *6–*9. 
 136. It may be argued that if replacing “element” with “limitation” is not enough, and 
“limitation” must still be defined, there is no purpose for replacing “element” in the first place. 
Perhaps it would be more feasible just to define “element” more clearly. However, this has 
already been attempted by various courts, as discussed above. See supra Part IV.A. Both a word 
change and a clear definition will be required for clarity and consistency in this area of the law. 
 137. Lesser-included inventions are those that meet some of the requirements of the 
claims, but not all of them. Under this scenario, just because the only limitation not met by the 
accused device happens to be a peripheral or unimportant limitation does not mean that the 
device infringes. The claim drafter is rightfully estopped as a result of including an extraneous 
limitation. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33–34 (1997). 
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formatting of the claims is not as significant as word choice.  
Indentation and spacing should not be considered a sufficient 
conscious, limiting act. In sum, the meaning of “limitation” should 
be tied to a conscious, limiting act—such as the original drafting (or 
subsequent insertion) of a word in a patent claim; it should not be 
tied to the patentee’s original formatting or superficial organization 
of claims.138 
Various wordings could be used to define “limitation” on this 
basis. However, in substance, the definition should be as follows: a 
limitation is a word or group of words that functions to define the 
metes and bounds of a claim, distinguishing the invention from 
other processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter. 
When the question is whether prosecution history estoppel should 
apply, one way of formulating the definition is as follows: a single 
limitation is any word or words added by amendment or argument 
that reflect(s) a single, new requirement added to the claims.139 This 
definition focuses on the limiting act by emphasizing the functions 
of the words—to define, distinguish, or require.140 Significant to the 
Kustoms Signals analysis, this definition also allows for the possibility 
that one word can indeed be a bona fide limitation. 
1. Implications of the proposed definition for the All Limitations Rule 
The proposed definition is not a drastic change from the 
definitions implicitly assumed by the courts in recent years for the All 
Elements Rule. The proposed definition does explicitly convey, 
however, that even a single word can have a limiting effect—enough 
to be considered, in itself, a limitation. The dictum in the Kustom 
 
 138. But see 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(i) (2002). 
 139. Note that argument-based estoppel and amendment-based estoppel are not very 
different. An amendment is visible on the face of the claims themselves, but any argument 
recorded by the PTO is also a matter of public record. Argument-based estoppel relies on a 
footnote to the claims, while amendment-based estoppel relies on the claims themselves. 
 140. Note that by tying the definition of “limitation” to a conscious, limiting act—or by 
giving it a functional, practical definition—the size of a limitation will be determined with 
reference to the prosecution history and comparison to the prior art. Just as obviousness is 
determined at the time the application was filed, the functional effect of a limiting act must be 
determined when that limiting act is made. To analyze the effect of an amendment, for 
example, a snapshot of the extant, contemporaneous prior art must be considered. After-arising 
equivalents must not be allowed to erode patent rights. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., dissenting), vacated by 
122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). 
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Signals case is troubling because it does not recognize this fact in the 
context of the All Elements Rule. The proposed definition would 
change the result of the CAFC’s All Elements analysis in Kustom 
Signals, bringing it in line with current patent law and good patent 
policy.141 
The proposed definition would bring harmony to the CAFC’s 
three-part analysis in Kustom Signals. As it stands, the Kustom 
Signals analysis is incongruous and even seems contradictory. The 
literal infringement result—that the “or” claim requirement defeats 
any argument of literal infringement—is completely inconsistent with 
the result of the All Elements analysis—that the “or” claim 
requirement is not an element for purposes of the All Elements 
Rule.142 That a single word in a claim can have enough stature and 
effect to defeat literal infringement may not be too startling, given 
the strict parallel that must exist in an accused product for literal 
infringement to be found. But the court’s assertion that the same 
word has absolutely no affect in the non-literal, equivalents analysis 
seems ludicrous, given its weight in the literal arena. The court does, 
however, consider “or” to be a “limiting term.”143 Thus, under the 
proposed rule, the word’s impact as a literal limitation would assure 
the word’s status as a limitation for purposes of the All Limitations 
Rule. 
2. Implications of the definition for prosecution history estoppel 
Under the proposed definition of “limitation” as any word or 
words added by amendment that reflect(s) a new requirement added 
to the claims, the test for prosecution history estoppel would be to 
determine if the accused device does or does not meet that new 
requirement. Under the facts presented in the Kustom Signals case, 
the application of the proposed rule would be straightforward. In 
that case, during prosecution of the patent, the word “and” was 
 
 141. In particular, it would resolve both the incongruity between the role a single word 
can play in prosecution history estoppel analysis and the role of the same word in All Elements 
Rule analysis. Thus, consistency and the notice function would both be served. See Perkin-
Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Festo, 
234 F.3d at 574–75; see also Brief for Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at *10–*13. 
 142. “The word ‘or’ is not itself an ‘element’ of an apparatus or a step of a method, and 
its presence to signify alternative elements does not convert ‘or’ into an element.” Kustom 
Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 143. Id. at 1332. 
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replaced with the word “or.”144 This substitution constituted a new 
requirement, added to the claims. Furthermore, this substitution 
changed the meaning of the claims so that they no longer covered a 
device that performed both functions at once, as had been required 
when the claims had used “and.” With the new word—“or”—in 
place, the claims required one function or the other to be performed, 
but not both simultaneously. The accused device did not meet that 
new requirement; it performed both functions at once, and would 
thus have been, under the proposed rule, beyond the reach of the 
claims, even under the doctrine of equivalents. 
This analysis under the proposed definition for “limitation” 
comports with the actual holding of Kustom Signals concerning 
prosecution history estoppel: 
The district court correctly concluded that the prosecution history 
estops Kustom from relying on the position that a device which 
searches for both fastest and strongest targets performs substantially 
the same function as a device which searches for either the fastest or 
the strongest target. During prosecution . . . Kustom amended 
claims 1 and 16 to include this limitation. . . . We affirm the grant 
of summary judgment of noninfringement on this alternative 
ground.145 
The CAFC itself recognized that an amendment adding the 
limitation “or” to claim language was sufficient to estop the patentee 
from later claiming that an “and” device was an equivalent. 
In the context of prosecution history estoppel, the greatest 
benefit of a limitation defined by the actual requirement it adds is 
that the notice function of the claims is thus maximized.146 The 
CAFC announced the primacy of the notice function with great 
fanfare in its Festo decision, and the Supreme Court acknowledged 
the importance of this policy.147 The proposed definition would 
 
 144. Id. at 1330. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Indeed, any definition of “element” or “limitation” would enhance the notice 
function of claims, since the courts have not yet defined either of these terms. The value of the 
proposed definition is deeper than this, however. 
 147. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 586 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), vacated by 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1837–40 (2002). In vacating the CAFC’s Festo decision, the 
Supreme Court actually emphasized the policy the CAFC had purportedly exalted in its Festo 
decision—that of consistency and predictability. The Supreme Court pointed out that “the 
doctrine of equivalents and . . . prosecution history estoppel are settled law” and that the 
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allow competitors to examine the prosecution history and the claim 
language to determine if in fact any limitations distinguished the 
claimed invention from the competitor’s product or method. If any 
arguments or amendments indicated the metes and bounds148 of the 
claimed invention, the competitor would simply note the specific 
characteristics affected. The competitor’s analysis would focus on the 
limiting effect of the argument or the amendment. 
Another benefit of the proposed definition for limitation is that it 
does not require the court to determine intent and to search for the 
true underlying reason for the amendment. Rather than gathering 
evidence on whether or not the patentee intended to amend for a 
reason substantially related to patentability, the court could instead 
focus on the practical limiting effect of the amendment itself.149 The 
limiting effect is much easier to determine than the patentee’s intent, 
especially given that litigation often arises many years after 
amendments are made. 
3. Consistent definitions for prosecution history estoppel and the All 
Limitations Rule 
The proposed definition would solve a further incongruity in 
Kustom Signals: the clash between the All Elements analysis and the 
prosecution history estoppel analysis in that case. On the one hand, 
the court does not consider “or” to be an element for purposes of 
 
CAFC should not have tried to “disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.” 
Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841. 
 148. The terms “metes and bounds” have long been used in the patent context to 
illustrate the similarities between a legal description of real property, where the borders and 
boundaries of a parcel of land are clearly described, and the language of a patent claim. See 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997). 
 149. The proposed definition for “limitation” would also be completely consistent with 
the ACLARA decision, and the ACLARA analysis provides a clear example of how the 
proposed definition of “limitation” should be applied. The ACLARA court does not discuss 
the reasons for the amendment; rather, it focuses on how the groups of words function to 
define the claimed invention and distinguish it from the prior art. In ACLARA, the patentee 
amended one of two adjacent limitations during prosecution of the patent application. The 
court held that such an amendment did not limit the doctrine of equivalents for the adjacent  
but un-amended limitation. The court placed the focus on the actual requirement added by 
the amendment, holding that “ACLARA’s amendment did not alter the electrode 
configuration component of the ‘plurality of electrodes’ clause. ACLARA did not surrender 
any subject matter related to where along the trenches the electrodes should be placed; its 
amendment was limited to whether the electrodes should be insulated from the medium.” 
ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Techs. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 391, 402 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
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the All Elements Rule. However, under the subsequent analysis, 
“or” is considered to be a significant limitation—so significant that it 
triggers prosecution history estoppel.150 The CAFC finds that the 
very limitation that successfully distinguished the invention from 
prior art during prosecution has no stature when the invention is 
compared to possibly infringing products. Possibly infringing 
products may infringe even if they lack the limitation that was so 
important during prosecution. In other words, the court finds that 
the same word in the same claims and context is not an element but 
is a limitation. This inconsistency would be completely reconciled 
under the proposed definition. Not only would the change eliminate 
confusion between the terms “element” and “limitation” by 
eliminating the former, but it would also establish that a word that is 
sufficient to distinguish from prior art is also a significant factor—a 
limitation—in the All Limitations analysis. 
The proposed definition would have more wide-reaching benefits 
than simply to harmonize the three analyses in the Kustom Signals 
case; it would also help to harmonize patent law. A consistent 
definition of “limitation” is a good idea for several reasons. Congress 
recognized the benefits of minimizing confusion and developing 
consistent, coherent patent rules when it created the CAFC and gave 
the court exclusive jurisdiction over patent law.151 This same policy 
of coherency would be served by a definition of “limitation” that is 
consistent for two areas of patent law. This consistency is especially 
important, given the overlap between prosecution history estoppel 
and the All Limitations Rule. The two rules both serve as limitations 
on the doctrine of equivalents, and since they are often analyzed 
together by the courts, it would sow confusion to have separate 
definitions of “limitation” for the two rules. Since both rules have 
given rise to recent confusion and both deal fundamentally with 
limitations, the two rules must remain in step and change together if 
they change at all. 
 
 150. “[P]rosecution history estops Kustom from relying on the position that a device 
which searches for both fastest and strongest targets performs substantially the same function 
as a device which searches for either the fastest or the strongest target. During prosecution, in 
response to a rejection for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, Kustom amended claims 1 and 
16 to include this limitation to the alternative search for magnitude or frequency. . . .” Kustom 
Signals, 264 F.3d at 1333 (emphasis added). 
 151. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 571; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981)). 
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Another argument favoring a consistent definition for the two 
rules is that such a definition is equitable; it does not in fact favor 
either the patentee or the accused infringer. The patentee of course 
prefers expansion of the doctrine of equivalents, arguing that the All 
Limitations Rule was never intended to completely preclude any 
assertion of the doctrine of equivalents. If the rule were taken too 
literally—for example, if every word in a claim represented an 
element for purposes of this rule—complex claims would rarely 
match up enough with accused devices for infringement to be 
found.152 The interests of the patentee are aligned with the policy 
that others should not be allowed to practice fraud on a patent, and 
this policy still resonates from the Supreme Court’s Warner-
Jenkinson decision.153 But although patentees prefer to have fewer, 
broader limitations for purposes of the All Limitations Rule, they 
prefer a more constrained definition for purposes of prosecution 
history estoppel. Indeed, patentees can use the same policy 
argument—that of preventing fraud on the patent—for both the 
broad and the narrow approach, depending on the context. For 
prosecution history estoppel, the patentee prefers a narrowly defined 
limitation because such a definition allows more of the claim 
language to be protected from equivalent infringement as well as 
literal infringement. 
Conversely, for both the All Limitations Rule and prosecution 
history estoppel, the accused infringer’s interests are directly opposed 
to those of the patentee. Where the patentee would have 
“limitation” defined broadly for purposes of the All Limitations 
Rule, the accused infringer would have it defined narrowly. 
However, where the patentee would have “limitation” defined 
narrowly for purposes of prosecution history estoppel, the accused 
infringer would have it defined more broadly. Of course, the accused 
infringer’s main policy argument centers on the notice function of 
claims and prevention of the fraudulent extension of patent rights. 
Because the proposed definition of “limitation” would not  
necessarily favor either party over the other, application of the 
proposed definition would lead to fairness as well as consistency. 
 
 152. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 153. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The two-part approach to defining the core terms of prosecution 
history estoppel and the All Limitations Rule thus accomplishes the 
foremost policies of recent patent law, while at the same time 
harmonizing the three analyses of Kustom Signals. It would give 
precedence to the notice function of claims, accomplishing what the 
CAFC attempted to do in the Festo case.154 It would lead to the 
correct conclusion that the word “or” can indeed be a limitation for 
purposes of the All Limitations Rule because it is a word that 
functions to define the metes and bounds of a claim, distinguishing 
the Kustom Signals radar from that of Applied Concepts. This 
approach is all the more viable because it is consistent with the 
current trends in the use of the term “limitation.” 
The proposed approach would do more than just eliminate the 
inconsistencies in the Kustom Signals case. It would provide clarity 
and definitional stability to a central part of patent law,  harmonizing 
prosecution history estoppel and the All Elements Rule. It would 
eliminate confusion and provide coherency for patent drafters, 
patentees, and the public. The resulting predictability would in turn 
enhance economic stability, truly promoting the progress of science 
and the useful arts. 
Philip M. Nelson 
 
 
 154. Festo, 234 F.3d at 574–75. 
